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Manufacturing FDI and Economic Growth: Evidence from Asian 
Economies 
By Miao Wang 
 
Previous empirical studies on inward foreign direct investment (FDI) and economic 
growth generate mixed results. This article suggests that the ambiguous results might be caused 
by the use of total FDI. We study the heterogeneous effects of different sector-level FDI inflows 
on host country’s economic growth. Data from 12 Asian economies over the period of 1987 to 
1997 are employed. Strong evidence shows that FDI in manufacturing sector has a significant 
and positive effect on economic growth in the host economies. FDI inflows in nonmanufacturing 
sectors do not play a significant role in enhancing economic growth. Furthermore, without the 
decomposition of total FDI inflows, the effect of manufacturing FDI on host country’s economic 
growth is understated by at least 48%. 
 
I. Introduction 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is considered a vehicle transferring both tangible assets 
and intangible assets such as advanced technology, better managerial skill and innovative 
product designs. Theoretically speaking, capital formation and technological improvement are 
the engines of economic growth. As a result, FDI is expected to promote host countries’ 
economic growth. It is generally accepted that the positive impact of FDI on growth is driven by 
FDI transferring assets relating to productivity improvement, or the spillover effect of FDI. 
However, the empirical evidence concerning FDI and economic growth is mixed. A number of 
articles that explore economic growth have argued that FDI promotes host countries’ economic 
growth directly or under certain circumstances. Among these articles are Blomstrom et al. (1994), 
Borensztein et al. (1998) and Liu et al. (2002) (see also Alfaro et al., 2004; Blonigen and Wang, 
2005; Kottaridi, 2005; Yao, 2006). For example, based on data from China over the period of 
1978 to 2000, Yao (2006) finds that FDI has a significantly positive effect on economic growth. 
Borensztein et al. (1998) find that FDI can only contribute to economic growth when the host 
country reaches a certain level of human capital. However, others find little or no evidence of FDI 
promoting host countries’ economic growth. Chakraborty and Basu (2002) argue that based on a 
time-series study, FDI does not Granger cause GDP in India. It is actually faster economic 
growth that attracts increased volume of FDI inflows (see also Choe, 2003; Choi, 2004; Carkovic 
and Levine, 2005). 
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With regard to the reasons for the ambiguous results, it can be caused by potential errors 
in the estimation method (Nair-Reichert and Weinhold, 2001). Mencinger (2003) finds a negative 
growth effect of FDI in eight transitional economies over the period of 1994 to 2001. The author 
proposes several reasons for a negative growth effect of FDI such as the form of FDI, including 
majority as Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) in these eight economies and the proceeds of M&A 
are spent on imports. This causes an increase in the current account deficit. De Mello (1997) 
points out that the actual growth effect depends on several channels through, which FDI can 
affect the host economies such as knowledge spillovers and complementarity or substitutability 
between FDI and host country domestic investment. Similar arguments are shared by the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). The Economic Survey for Europe (UNECE, 
2001) states that the growth effect of FDI in transitional recipient economies depends on actual 
circumstances in those host countries.  
In our article, we suggest that one possible reason for the mixed evidence in the empirical 
FDI-Growth literature is the use of total FDI. Multinational Corporations (MNCs) undertake FDI in 
different sectors in the host country, such as agricultural, manufacturing, or financial sectors. 
When using total FDI, previous studies have been making a strong assumption that FDI in 
different sectors has the same impact on host country’s economic growth. If different sector-level 
FDI contributes differently to economic growth, the aggregation can blur the actual growth effect 
and lead to ambiguous results.  
To our knowledge, there is no systematic empirical study on the growth effects of inward 
FDI in different sectors in the literature. Inward FDI in various sectors are different in nature and 
volume. For instance, spillover effect of FDI is considered more likely to occur in manufacturing 
sector than in other sectors and the empirical discussions of spillover effect are often based on 
FDI in manufacturing industries/sector (Chuang and Lin, 1999; Chuang and Hsu, 2004). It raises 
interesting questions: does FDI in manufacturing sector have the same impact on growth as FDI 
in agricultural sector? Or is there important heterogeneity across sectors in the effect of FDI on 
growth?  
In this article, we undertake the analysis based on a unique data set that consists of both 
total and disaggregated FDI data for 12 Asian economies over the period of 1987 to 1997. Our 
article contributes to the existing literature in three respects.  
First, with our unique data for Asian economies, we focus on sector-level FDI instead of 
total FDI inflows in this study. Our results show that FDI in different sectors does have different 
impacts on host country’s economic growth. Aggregating different types of FDI together could 
blur the actual growth effect of FDI and generate mixed results.  
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Second, we further find that previous studies underestimate the growth effect of 
manufacturing FDI because of aggregation. Our results indicate that the growth effect of 
manufacturing FDI is much stronger than the growth effect of total FDI. It appears that when 
different types of inward FDI are aggregated, the actual effect of manufacturing FDI on host 
country’s economic growth could be understated by 48%.  
Third, our study provides better policy guidance to developing countries (LDCs). FDI 
inflows in LDCs have grown dramatically from $10 billion in 1986 to $163 billion in 1997. In 
addition to the increasing volume, FDI is playing an important role in private capital flows to LDCs. 
For example, FDI inflows represented 66.8% of total private capital flows to LDCs in 1998, 
compared with a 38.5% in 1990 (Perkins et al., 2001). Furthermore, manufacturing FDI accounts 
for the lion’s share of inward FDI in LDCs. In 1988, the share of manufacturing FDI in total FDI in 
LDCs was approximately 66%. In 1998, the share of manufacturing FDI in LDCs was 
approximately 50%. As our results show that the positive impact of FDI on economic growth 
comes from manufacturing FDI rather than nonmanufacturing FDI, the host country could benefit 
more from inward FDI if policymakers appropriately reallocate the resources to attract FDI in 
specific sectors.  
This article proceeds as follows: in Section II, we introduce the analytical framework as to 
how FDI can impact economic growth, followed by the empirical specification. In Section III, we 
present the data. Section IV discusses the empirical results. Section V concludes.  
 
II. Analytical Framework 
The model in this article is based on the idea of endogenous growth as in Romer (1990) 
and follows closely Borensztein et al. (1998).1 
Suppose the economy produces a single consumption good ( ௧ܻ) according to the 
production technology: 
௧ܻ ൌ ܣܪఈ ෍݇ሺ݆ሻ௧ଵିఈ
ே
௝ୀଵ
 (1)
where ܣ represents the state of environment in the economy; ܪ represents human capital and 
is assumed to be a given endowment. We assume that there are ܰ varieties of physical capital 
in the economy and ݇ሺ݆ሻ represents capital variety ݆. 
Each variety of capital is produced by a specialized firm and the firm rents the capital 
good to consumption good producers at a rental rate ݔሺ݆ሻ. It follows that the demand for capital 
good j from the consumption good producers satisfies the following condition:  
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ݔሺ݆ሻ௧ ൌ ܣܪఈሺ1 െ ߙሻ݇ሺ݆ሻ௧ଵିఈ (2)
Two types of firms, domestic and foreign, produce different varieties of capital goods. Domestic 
firms produce n varieties of capital goods and foreign firms produce ݊∗varieties. In other words, 
ܰ ൌ ݊ ൅ ݊∗.To increase the varieties of capital goods, firms must adopt advanced technology 
and the adoption of new technology requires a fixed set-up cost ሺܨሻ. New advanced knowledge 
is brought into the country by foreign firms. The new knowledge brought into the host country by 
a foreign firm might already exist in other countries. Since imitating the technology used by a 
foreign firm and produce a new ݇ሺ݆ሻ is much easier than breaking through the technology 
frontier, it is assumed that the set-up cost ሺܨሻ is decreasing in the ratio of foreign firms to the 
total firms in the host country ሺ݊∗/ܰሻ. In addition, domestic firms imitate easier technology first. 
As more varieties of capital goods are produced, it gets harder to imitate more advanced foreign 
technology and produce a new variety. So the setup cost is assumed to be positively related to 
the ratio of the number of capital varieties produced in the host country to those produced in 
advance economies ሺܰ/ܰ∗ሻ: 
ܨ ൌ ܨ ൬݊
∗
ܰ ,
ܰ
ܰ൰ , where	
߲ܨ
߲ሺ݊∗/ܰሻ ൏ 0;
߲ܨ
߲ሺܰ∗/ܰሻ ൐ 0 (3)
The production of capital ݆ has a constant marginal cost of one and the capital depreciates fully 
each period. As the fixed cost is incurred only in the beginning stage of production ሺݐ ൌ 0ሻ, the 
subsequent profits for the firm producing a new variety of capital good in each period is:  
ߨሺ݆ሻ௧ ൌ ݔሺ݆ሻ௧݇ሺ݆ሻ௧ െ ݇ሺ݆ሻ௧, ∀ݐ ൐ 0. (4)
In equilibrium, ߨሺ݆ሻ௧, ݔሺ݆ሻ௧ and ݇ሺ݆ሻ௧ will be constant overtime. Maximizing Equation 4 subject 
to the demand function given by Equation 2 presents the equilibrium level of production of capital 
݆: 
݇ሺ݆ሻ ൌ ܣଵ ఈ⁄ ܪሺ1 െ ߙሻଶ/ఈ (5)
Equations 2 and 5 together generate the equilibrium rental rate for capital ݆: 
ݔሺ݆ሻ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߙሻିଵ. (6)
After solving the optimal profit in each period, one can calculate the present value of the total 
profit for a capital good producer: 
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Πሺ݆ሻ ൌ െܨ ൬݊
∗
ܰ ,
ܰ
ܰ∗൰ ൅෍ሾݔሺ݆ሻ݇ሺ݆ሻ െ ݇ሺ݆ሻሿ
ஶ
௦ୀ௧
൬ 11 ൅ ݎ൰
௦ାଵି௧
 (7)
where ݎ represents the interest rate in the economy. Assume there is free entry in the capital 
goods market. The present value of profits should be zero for capital good producers. Solving for 
the zero profit condition and considering Equations 5 and 6, it follows that:  
ݎ ൌ ܣଵఈߙሺ1 െ ߙሻଶିఈఈ ܨ ൬݊
∗
ܰ ,
ܰ
ܰ∗൰
ିଵ
ܪ. (8)
Suppose the representative household in the model maximizes utility over an infinite horizon:  
ܷ ൌ ෍ߚ௧ log ܥ௧
ஶ
௧ୀ଴
 (9)
where ܥ௧ is the consumption of the final product ௧ܻ. Given the interest rate ݎ, the optimal 
consumption path is shown by the condition:  
g௖ ൌ ߚሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ െ 1 (10)
where g௖ is the growth rate of consumption. In a steady state, the consumption growth rate g௖ 
should be equal to the output growth rate g: 
g௖ ൌ g ൌ ߚ ቈ߫ܨ ൬݊
∗
ܰ ,
ܰ
ܰ∗൰
ିଵ
ܪ ൅ 1቉ െ 1 (11)
where ߫ ൌ ܣభഀߙሺ1 െ ߙሻሺଶିఈሻ/ఈ. 
To explore empirically the effects of inward total FDI (FDI) on host country ݅’s economic 
growth (g) at time ݐ, we utilize the following formulation: 
g௜௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߩ
ሺ൅ሻ
ܨܦܫ௜௧ ൅ ߜሺെሻ
log	 ௜ܻ଴ ൅ ߶ܪ௜଴ ൅ ߣሺ൅ሻ
ܣ௜௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧ (12)
where ଴ܻ stands for the initial GDP of the host country, which is a proxy for 
ே
ே∗; ܪ଴ is the initial 
human capital level; the group of control variables ܣ ൌ ሼܦ݋݉݁ݏݐ݅ܿ	݅݊ݒ݁ݏݐ݉݁݊ݐሺ൅ሻ;	
	ܮܾܽ݋ݑݎ	݂݋ݎܿ݁	ሺ൅ሻ; 	ܶݎ݁݊݀	ሺ? ሻሽ (see also Balasubramanyam et al., 1996). 
We distinguish FDI and domestic investment in the model to allow for the two types of 
investment to affect a country’s economic growth differently, depending upon the efficiency, 
management, or technology. Expected signs of the coefficients are attached to corresponding 
variables. Domestic investment is expected to have a positive coefficient because of its 
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contribution to capital formation. FDI is considered to promote technology improvement. And we 
expect the coefficient on FDI to be positive. 
We then divide total FDI into different sector-level FDI and the empirical specification 
takes the following form: 
g௜௧ ൌ ߙ ൅෍ ߩ௞
ሺ? ሻ
ܨܦܫ௜௞௧
௞
൅ ߜ
ሺെሻ
log ௜ܻ଴ ൅ ߶ܪ௜଴ ൅ ߣሺ൅ሻ
ܣ௜௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧ (13)
where ܨܦܫ௜௞௧ represents inward FDI in sector ݇, country ݅, during period ݐ. Other independent 
variables have the same interpretation as in Equation 12. ܨܦܫ௜௞௧ variables are our variables of 
interest. If the coefficients on those sector-level FDI ሺߩ௞ሻ are significantly different from each 
other, it indicates that inward FDI in different sectors have differential impacts on host country’s 
economic growth.  
 
III. Data 
Sector/industry-level FDI data are essential to our study. Recent disaggregated FDI data 
by country can be obtained from different issues of World Investment Directory (WID) published 
by the United Nations. However, no single issue of WID discusses FDI information in details for 
all countries. Each particular issue of WID covers only the information for a certain group of 
countries. To be more specific, the issue of 1992 WID discusses FDI in developed countries 
(DCs). The issue of 1994 covers FDI in Latin America and the Caribbean. The issue of 1996 
covers FDI in Africa and West Asia. The issue of 2000 discusses FDI in countries of Asia and the 
Pacific. The most recent issue available to the authors, the issue of 2003, discusses FDI in Latin 
American countries again.  
Since the effect of FDI on economic growth is more relevant in LDCs and to be consistent 
with previous literature (Borensztein et al., 1998; Liu et al., 2002; Blonigen and Wang, 2005), we 
concentrate on inward FDI data in LDCs. The ideal data set for our study would include 
sector/industry-level inward FDI in a large number of LDCs. However, the disaggregated FDI 
data for LDCs discussed in the issues of 1994, 1996 and 2003 are typically not adequate for the 
purpose of our empirical study. For example, in the 1994 issue, countries in Latin America and 
the Caribbean generally have only two years of disaggregated FDI data available (1980 and 
1990). Countries in Africa and West Asia do not report the sectorial distribution of FDI inflows at 
all. 
Among all the issues available to the authors, the issue of 2000 provides the most 
consistent and complete disaggregated FDI data for certain countries. According to the 
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availability of the disaggregated FDI data, our empirical sample includes 12 Asian economies: 
Bangladesh, Mainland China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Taiwan. The data set is unbalanced and spans up to 11 
years from 1987 to 1997 when possible. The number of countries and time span of the sample is 
determined solely by data availability. Table 1 gives the descriptive statistics of FDI inflows in 
each of the 12 economies. 
In our sample, FDI is measured as FDI inflows as a share of host countries’ GDP. 
The dependent variable is growth rate of per capita real GDP, measured as the log 
difference of per capita real GDP in host countries. GDP and per capita GDP come from the 
World Economic Outlook 2001 database provided by International Monetary Fund (IMF). Real 
values of GDP and per capita GDP are obtained using deflator from the World Development 
Indicators 1999 by World Bank. The average annual growth rate in our sample is 6.5%, with a 
maximum of 11.2%, a minimum of -0.8% and a SD of 4%. 
Initial real GDP is measured as real GDP at the initial sample year for each host economy. 
When necessary, data reported in local currencies are converted into US dollars based on the 
current year average market exchange rate. The exchange rates are obtained from the Key 
Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific countries (henceforth Key Indicators) 2001 published 
by the Asian Development Bank (ADB). 
The initial level of human capital comes from Barro and Lee (1993) and is measured as 
the average years of secondary schooling in male population at the initial sample year for each 
host county/region. This is a commonly used measure of human capital in growth literature and 
FDI literature (Barro, 1997; Borensztein et al. 1998; Xu, 2000; Blonigen and Wang, 2005). Barro 
and Lee (1994) point out that this measure is most significantly correlated with economic growth. 
Data for education in Barro and Lee (1993) are reported every 5 years between 1960 and 1990 
and the year of 1985 is picked as the initial year for countries/regions in our sample. We also use 
the measure of average years of secondary schooling in total population (SYR) and the average 
years of schooling in total population (TYR) from Barro and Lee (2001) as alternative measures 
of human capital. Different measures of human capital do not alter our empirical results. The 
results with SYR and TYR are not reported, but are available upon request.  
Domestic investment is measured as the difference between gross fixed capital formation 
(GFCF) as a share of GDP and inward FDI as a share of GDP (i.e. ሺܩܨܥܨ/ܩܦܲሻ െ ሺܨܦܫ/ܩܦܲሻ). 
GFCF could be considered as the total investment in a country. Inward FDI is investment by 
foreign firms. As a result, the difference between GFCF and FDI as a share of GDP becomes a 
measure of domestic investment (United Nations, 1999; Agrawal, 2000). GFCF is obtained from 
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Key Indicators 2001 by ADB. 
The labour force growth is the growth rate of labour force, measured as the log difference 
of labour force. Labour force information is from the World Development Indicators by World 
Bank and the Key Indicators 2001 by ADB.  
 
IV. Empirical Results 
Total FDI 
Table 2 summarizes the regression results concerning the impact of total FDI inflows on 
economic growth.2 We estimate the regression using random effects estimation, weighted least 
squares (WLS) controlling for heteroskedasticity and feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) 
panel regression. Hausman test shows that the random effects estimation is preferred to fixed 
effects estimation in this case. WLS is applied because the volume and nature of inward FDI in 
small and large economies are quite different (Blonigen and Haynes, 2002). Real GDP of each 
economy is used as the weight. FGLS allows for a more general variance covariance matrix. 
FGLS and WLS give similar estimated coefficients. To save space, only results of random effects 
estimation and WLS are reported.3  
As we can see, total FDI inflows have a positive and significant effect on host country’s 
economic growth. Based on Random Effects estimation, we see that a 1% increase in the FDI 
share of GDP is associated with a 0.78–1.17% increase in real per capita GDP growth. Similarly, 
WLS estimation shows that a 1% increase in FDI corresponds to a 0.87–1.23% increase in real 
per capita GDP growth, holding other things constant.4 
Domestic investment is also an important source of economic growth. The coefficient on 
domestic investment has the expected positive sign and is significant. The initial level of human 
capital is positive and significant in all regressions, which indicates that the host country must be 
able to absorb the advanced technology embodied in FDI. The initial level of GDP has a 
significant and negative sign supporting the conditional convergence of economic growth widely 
suggested in the literature. 
Another interesting finding from the results is that FDI is more efficient than domestic 
investment in terms of promoting economic growth. Based on the estimation, using the full set of 
independent variables, the coefficient on FDI is 1.17 (Random Effects), while the coefficient on 
domestic investment is 0.44. Wald tests show the coefficient on FDI is significantly greater than 
the coefficient on domestic investment at the 1% level.  
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Decomposition of Total FDI 
When using total FDI inflows data to estimate the growth effect of FDI, it is actually 
assumed that different sector-level FDI has homogeneous impact on host country’s economic 
growth. However, there is no a priori reason for this assumption. Appropriate treatment is 
necessary to reveal the true impact of FDI on economic growth. Panel (A) and (B) in Table 3 
summarize the regression results using disaggregated FDI for potential different effects of 
different sector-level FDI. 
We first divide total inward FDI into manufacturing FDI (manufacturing) and 
nonmanufacturing FDI (nonmanufacturing). Manufacturing FDI includes FDI in Food, Beverage 
and Tobacco, Textiles, Leather and Clothing, Chemicals and Rubber products, Nonmetallic 
Products and Basic Metal Products, Machinery and Equipment, Electrical Machinery and 
Apparatus, Motor Vehicles and Other Transportation Equipment and Other Manufacturing. 
Nonmanufacturing sector includes Agriculture and Mining, Construction, Finance, Other Service 
and Others. Our sample annual average of manufacturing FDI as a share of GDP is 1.49%. Over 
the sample period, FDI inflows in Bangladesh, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore are 
exclusively in the manufacturing sector. FDI inflows in the manufacturing sector in the other eight 
economies fluctuate over the sample years. On average, manufacturing FDI accounts for 50–80% 
of total FDI inflows in these economies with an exception of Pakistan. The annual average ratio 
of manufacturing FDI to total FDI inflows in Pakistan is 16%. The majority of Pakistan’s inward 
FDI is in Agriculture and oil-related industries. According to the Board of Investment (BOI), 
Government of Pakistan, the number one reason for foreign investors to invest in Pakistan is the 
‘abundant land and natural resources’.5 In our sample, the annual average ratio of Agricultural 
FDI and Other FDI to the total FDI inflows in Pakistan is 56%. 
Panel (A) in Table 3 represents results for the two-sector decomposition. As we can see, 
FDI in the manufacturing sector has a positive and significant impact on economic growth, but 
nonmanufacturing FDI does not contribute much to the host country’s economic growth. Based 
on Random Effects estimation, we find that a 1% increase in manufacturing FDI as a share of 
GDP leads to a 1.55% increase in per capita real GDP growth, ceteris paribus. Furthermore, the 
Random Effects estimation in Table 2, which evaluates the contribution of total FDI to economic 
growth, shows that a 1% increase in FDI as a share of GDP corresponds to a 1.17% increase in 
economic growth, holding other things constant. It appears that manufacturing FDI has a much 
stronger positive effect on a country’s economic growth than one has generally expected. 
One concern with the empirical results is that the significance of manufacturing FDI might 
be driven by the fact that FDI inflows are exclusively in the manufacturing sector in four of our 
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economies mentioned above. To address this issue, we estimate those regressions by excluding 
Bangladesh, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore. The results do not change substantially 
compared to those from the share of GDP is 1.49%.  
Panel (B) in Table 3 presents a more detailed FDI decomposition results. In panel (B), 
total FDI inflows are divided into six sectors, with each expressed as a share of the host 
economy’s GDP: Agriculture and Mining (agriculture), Manufacturing (manufacturing), 
Construction (construction), Finance (finance), Other Service (service) and Others (others). After 
the decomposition of FDI, the coefficient on manufacturing FDI is positive and significant in all 
regressions. Coefficients on most other sector-level FDI are not significant at conventional levels. 
The results indicate that only FDI in the manufacturing sector plays an important role in 
enhancing economic growth of the host economies in our sample. Our sample average of 
manufacturing FDI as a share of GDP is 1.49%. The point estimate of 1.74 implies that without 
manufacturing FDI, the sample average economic growth would drop by 2.59%, holding other 
things constant.7 The actual effect will be smaller since we do not consider here the 
substitutability between domestic investment and FDI in the form of cross-border merger and 
acquisition. 
Results from Panel (B) in Table 3 also show that the magnitude of the coefficient on 
manufacturing FDI (1.74–2.32) is larger than the magnitude of the coefficient on total FDI inflows 
(1.17–1.23) in Table 2. It suggests that previous studies have underestimated the effect of 
manufacturing FDI on host countries’ economic growth because of aggregation. Indeed, the 
difference is not negligible. The estimated growth effect of manufacturing FDI could be 48% 
larger than the estimated growth effect of total FDI.8 As we have noticed, for most LDCs, the 
lion’s share of FDI inflows goes to manufacturing sector. And for some LDCs, FDI inflows are 
solely in manufacturing sector. Results from the disaggregated FDI estimation might provide 
better guidance for LDCs’ policies toward FDI, or policies toward FDI in different sectors or 
industries. 
Most of the FDI inflows in these 12 Asian economies come from Japan, the US and 
Western Europe. One possible reason why the growth-promoting effect is stronger in the 
manufacturing sector in the sample is that spillover effects of FDI might be stronger in 
manufacturing sector. The manufacturing sector includes both labour-intensive industries (food 
and beverage; textiles, leather and clothing) and R&D-intensive industries (computers, electrical 
machinery) but other sectors do not.9 
In labour-intensive industries, a large number of host country workers are employed by 
foreign firms. The spillover effects may be important in the short run through the training of host 
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country workers. Furthermore, due to ‘cost differentials in research salaries between developing 
and industrialized countries’ (United Nations, 1999), there is also R&D-intensive FDI in 
manufacturing sector.10 A high concentration of R&D by the foreign affiliates may help to improve 
the skill or technology level of host country firms and promote growth. For example, the 1994 
R&D expenditure of the US affiliates in Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Malaysia accounted 
for about 54% of US affiliates R&D in developing countries.  
Another possible reason for the different effects of manufacturing FDI and other 
sector-level FDI, such as service, might be caused by the form of FDI entry, i.e. greenfield 
investment and M&A, in different sectors. It would be interesting to further investigate this issue. 
Reliable estimation requires sector-level/ industry-level greenfield and M&A in host countries. 
However, due to data availability, this detailed study is beyond the scope of our current article. 
Instead, we look at country-level greenfield and M&A and their effects on economic growth. M&A 
data come from United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) foreign direct 
investment database. There are no available data on greenfield investment. Our best estimate of 
greenfield investment is to take the difference between total FDI and M&A. The sample size is 
reduced to 88 for the greenfield and M&A estimation. We find that greenfield investment tends to 
have a positive and significant impact on economic growth, while the coefficient on M&A 
generally is not significant at conventional levels. Intuitively, greenfield investment is associated 
with addition of production capacity, while M&A is typically associated with simple transfer of 
ownership. 
Furthermore, we separate our sample into different sub-samples according to host 
countries’ greenfield FDI and M&A information. First, we collect observations satisfying gfdummy 
= 1 (gfdummy is a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if a country’s greenfield 
investment share as a GDP is greater than the sample annual average greenfield investment 
share as a GDP; 0 otherwise). Regression based on these observations will help us to detect 
whether and how the coefficients on sector-level FDI will change if the country has a larger share 
of greenfield investment than other countries in the sample. If forms of FDI in different sectors 
affect economic growth, we should observe some changes in the estimated coefficients. In 
addition, we collect observations satisfying gf_madummy = 1 (gf_ madummy is a dummy 
variable, which takes the value of 1 if a country’s greenfield investment share of GDP is greater 
than its M&A share of GDP; 0 otherwise). This regression helps us to detect whether and how 
the coefficients on sector-level FDI will change if the country has predominantly greenfield 
investment. Again, if forms of FDI in different sectors affect the growth impacts of FDI, we might 
be able to observe some changes in the estimated coefficients. 
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Empirical results from the two sub-sample regressions do not differ qualitatively from the 
whole sample regression. Manufacturing FDI has positive and significant coefficient, while 
coefficients on other sector-level FDI are not significant at conventional levels. These preliminary 
results certainly do not suggest forms of FDI in different sectors play insignificant role in affecting 
economic growth. Rather, they provide some guidance for our future research regarding this 
topic. Indeed, more detailed break-down of FDI data in host countries is required to provide a 
better answer.11 
 
Decomposition of Sector FDI 
We further decompose inward FDI in the manufacturing sector into several industries: 
Food, Beverage and Tobacco (FBT), Textiles, Leather and Clothing (T), Chemicals and Rubber 
Products (CR), Nonmetallic Products and Basic Metal Products (MET), Machinery and 
Equipment, Electrical Machinery and Apparatus (MAC), Motor Vehicles and Other 
Transportation Equipment (MOTOR), Wood (W) and Other Manufacturing (O). All the industrial 
level FDI inflows are expressed as a share of GDP of host countries/regions. 
Our sample in this case consists of only ten economies instead of the original 12 
economies. There is virtually no industry-level information on FDI inflows in the manufacturing 
sector for China and Pakistan. Therefore, these two countries are excluded from the regression. 
Based on our sample, the annual average share of T FDI in total manufacturing FDI is 0.06. In 
other words, each year, 6% of manufacturing FDI flows into Textiles, Leather and Clothing 
industries. FDI in MOTOR accounts for 5% of total FDI in manufacturing sector. FDI in FBT and 
MET account for 7 and 10% of total manufacturing FDI, respectively. Around 28% of 
manufacturing FDI flows into MAC, 22% to CR,3%to W and 18% to O. Table 4 reports the 
regression results. Based on different regressions, coefficients on FDI variables in 
nonmanufacturing sectors are not significant at conventional levels. The most robust result is 
that the Other Manufacturing FDI has a significant and positive coefficient. FDI in MOTOR, T and 
MAC seem to also help economic growth. However, these results are less robust. 
 
Endogeneity 
One may also be concerned with that inward FDI might be endogenous. FDI inflows can 
promote host countries’ economic growth. However, a country with a high growth rate could 
possibly attract more FDI because of a better investment environment. We therefore, adopt the 
instrumental variables (IV) method to control for the potential endogeneity problem. Theoretically 
speaking, ideal instruments should be variables correlated with FDI, but not with the error term. 
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In reality, good instruments are often hard to obtain. We collect the lagged FDI, openness, 
business environment risk index, and log value of host country’s area as instruments in this study. 
Openness is measured as the sum of imports and exports divided by host country’s GDP. The 
business environment risk index is obtained from Business Environment Risk Intelligence S.A. 
The index ranges from 0 to 100 and is a composite score of operation risk index, political risk 
index and remittance and repatriation factor. A score of 100 indicates a perfect environment for 
foreign business. A score between 0 and 39 represents an unacceptable environment for foreign 
business operation. Including area as one of the instruments is to catch the effect that some 
inward FDI is oriented toward the host country’s domestic market. A large area could suggest a 
relatively large domestic market. Data on area come from Frankel and Romer (1999).12 
Table 5 reports the IV estimation results. The first column summarizes the economic 
impact of total FDI inflows. The second column shows the impact of manufacturing FDI and the 
impact of nonmanufacturing FDI. 
Consistent with our previous findings in this article, manufacturing FDI has a significant 
and positive coefficient. Nonmanufacturing FDI has a negative coefficient, while not statistically 
significant. The results confirm that manufacturing FDI contributes positively to economic growth 
but non-manufacturing FDI does not. Also, aggregating different types of FDI inflows understates 
the actual effect of manufacturing FDI on host country’s economic growth. 
 
V. Conclusion 
The impact of FDI on growth is intriguing and of intense interest for policy-making 
purposes. Even though endogenous growth theory predicts a positive relationship between 
inward FDI and economic growth, the empirical studies typically generate ambiguous results. We 
suggest that using total FDI in previous studies might blur the effects of FDI and lead to such 
ambiguous results. This article’s contribution is to distinguish the impacts of inward FDI on 
economic growth by using FDI in different sectors. It allows us to test whether different 
sector-level FDI inflows have different effects on a host country’s economic growth. Panel 
regressions based on a sample of 12 Asian economies over the period of 1987 to 1997 show 
that different types of FDI do have different impacts on host country’s economic growth. Inward 
FDI in the manufacturing sector plays a very important role in enhancing the economic growth, 
but FDI in nonmanufacturing sectors does not. Furthermore, since manufacturing FDI accounts 
for the lion’s share of FDI inflows in developing countries, logically it makes sense to detect the 
effect of different sector-level inward FDI, manufacturing FDI in particular. If FDI inflows in the 
manufacturing sector have a stronger impact on economic growth, then favourable policies can 
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be made to attract more FDI in that sector. Interestingly, we also find that using the total FDI 
inflows underestimates the actual effect of manufacturing FDI on host country’s economic growth 
by at least 48%. In other words, the effect of manufacturing FOI in our article is stronger than the 
effect of total FDI shown in previous studies. 
Our results provide some support for the potential different effects of sector-level FDI in 
Terms of enhancing growth. There are other interesting issues that deserve further exploration. 
For instance, are different growth effects of sector-level FDI caused by different forms of FDI? 
Another possible extension of this article is to study the growth in different sectors. To be more 
specific, nonmanufacturing FDI in the agricultural and the mining sector might not have a 
significant impact on the overall per capita GDP growth, but it might promote growth in 
agricultural and mining sectors. Moreover, if data over longer time periods are available, 
time-varying estimation, such as rolling regressions, could be used to trace the impact of FDI 
corresponding to changes in international trade policies in host countries over years.  
 
Notes 
1. Endogenous growth theory (Romer, 1986; Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992) 
stresses that endogenous technology improvement or innovation is the engine of sustained 
economic growth. For example, Romer (1990) takes an approach that incorporates industrial 
innovation as the source of economic growth. He suggests that research and development 
(R&D) are necessary to obtain new ideas for increasing the variety or quality of intermediate 
goods, which in turn help to increase the quantity or quality of final output. Although 
technology improvement is the link between FDI and economic growth, it’s not the focus of 
this article. 
2. Portmanteau and Bartlett’s white noise tests are conducted on each country’s 
WLS regression residuals. Both tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of white noise at 
conventional levels for total FDI inflows regression and FDI decomposition regressions. 
3. Results based on other estimation methods can be obtained upon requests. 
4. In an earlier version of this article, gross domestic savings are used as a proxy for 
domestic investment. The correlation between gross domestic savings and our current 
measure of domestic investment is 0.7613. We assume that domestic firms are most likely to 
borrow from domestic financial institutions and finance their investment. As a result, domestic 
savings can be a proxy for investment made by domestic firms. The two sets of results do not 
differ qualitatively. The coefficient on FDI tends to be smaller when we use gross domestic 
savings as a proxy for domestic investment. 
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5. Quote from BOI, Government of Pakistan. 
http://www.pakboi.gov.pk/FAQs/why_invest_in_pakistan.html  
6. The dependent variable is growth of real per capita GDP, and FDI variable is 
measured as a share of GDP. It is likely that the correlation between FDI and economic 
growth is because that both measures have GDP in them. Regression analysis using real 
FDI in billions of dollars shows that the manufacturing FDI effect is positive and significant at 
the 1% level and nonmanufacturing FDI effect is negative and significant. To be consistent 
with the measure adopted in previous literature, in this paper we keep the measure of FDI as 
a share of host country’s GDP. 
7. The sample average of manufacturing FDI as a share of GDP is 1.49%. Based on 
random effects estimation ,the growth impact of manufacturing FDI is 1.49 * 1.74 = 2.59%, 
ceteris paribus. 
8. (1.74 - 1.17)/1.17 = 0.487. 
9. The literature of the spillover effect of FDI provides a link between investment and 
economic growth. This article does not focus on detailed spillover effect of FDI. See Caves 
(1974), Germidis (1977), Globerman (1979), Mansfield and Romeo (1980), Barrell and Pain 
(1997), and Aitken and Harrison (1999) for further discussion about this topic. 
10. For example, Sony Corporation of Japan has nine R&D units in developing Asian 
countries. Three of them are in Singapore, three in Malaysia, one in Korea, one in Taiwan, 
and one in Indonesia. They conduct R&D on different Sony electronic products, such as the 
optical data storage devices, the design of compact discs, and so on. Over time, this R&D 
‘generally shades into genuine innovation, especially where the skill base is good ...’ (United 
Nations, 1999). 
11. The regressions are not reported, but are available upon request. 
12. The risk index is not available for Bangladesh and Hong Kong. Thus, instruments 
of FDI for Hong Kong and Bangladesh do not include the risk index. 
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